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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the effect of exchange rate policy on the bi-lateral intra-
WAMZ and global inter-WAMZ export trade, with a view to gauging its relative veracity 
among other determinants. The regression results show that the coefficient estimates of 
bilateral exchange rate (variable of interest in this study) was not significant in 
explaining the changes in the bilateral intra-WAMZ exports.  This is not the case with 
the world inter-WAMZ regression results in which one of the partner’s exchange rate is 
significant and positively influences their collective exports to the rest of the world.  This 
result is considered interesting as it tends to validate the assertion that exchange rates 
does not matter much to intra-WAMZ exports to warrant its use as an instrument of 
bilateral trade stimulation, but can potentially be useful as a common tool of balance of 
payment adjustment against the rest of the world (third parties).  In conclusion, the study 
inferred that the maintenance of independent flexible exchange rate policy by either 
party to the bilateral trade makes no difference in terms of export performance, and may 
indeed constitute an impediment to free trade within the WAMZ region. Among the 
impediments identified are the microeconomic costs of foreign exchange conversion and 
high incident of trade diversion associated with it. 
                                                 
* E. D. Balogun is a Lecturer in the Dept. of Economics, University of Lagos.  The views expressed in this 
paper are strictly those of the author. 
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1. Introduction 
 Exchange rate policy and export performance has been studied in a large number of 
theoretical and empirical papers globally, focusing on its regime, extent of volatility and 
nominal/real effects.  While there seem to be no ambiguity about exchange rates regimes 
effects on bi-lateral export trade between developed economies with competitive market 
profile, it is however debatable when analyzed from the perspective of developing 
countries that are mainly primary commodity producers.  Indeed, for developed economies 
with convertible or traded currencies, the traditional view is that a responsive exchange 
rate policy serves as incentives and guide to investors on the effective way to strike a 
balance between trading and investing at home or abroad.   The need to contend with a rise 
in exchange rate volatility becomes imperative because of the uncertainty of profits on 
contracts denominated in a foreign currency.    Egert, et. al. (2005) note that there is no 
consensus on this view, as most studies show that there is no clear and statistically 
significant link between exchange rate regimes and aggregate or bilateral export flows.   
Although a number of studies have pointed to the likelihood that exchange rate volatility 
could depress or have negative effects on exports of developing countries, it is again 
debatable if such effects would be significant given the fact that most of their currencies 
are un-traded but pegged to a basket of major traded currencies.  
  The pertinent research question that this study seeks to answer is: has an 
independent exchange rate policy of participating countries in the WAMZ been important 
in the determination of bilateral export flows to the extent that it could imply significant 
losses when they give up its control?  The objective of this test is to assess the effect of 
exchange policy on bilateral export trade among WAMZ countries. The hypothesis to be 
tested is that independent exchange rate policies of each participating country in the 
WAMZ have been relatively ineffective in influencing bilateral export trade. 
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2. Conceptual Framework and Literature Review 
Foreign exchange rate is simply the rate at which one currency exchanges for 
another (Jhingan, 2003; Appleyard & Field , 1998).  A most prominent issue in economic 
literature is the degree of exchange rate flexibility that should be permitted by any country.  
An exchange rate system is said to fixed if it permits only very small, if any, deviation 
from officially declared currency values.  However, by flexible exchange rates, we mean 
rates that are completely free to vary.  A hybrid of the two is represented by the Optimum 
Currency Area (OCA), which for optimal balance-of-payments adjustments and 
effectiveness of domestic macroeconomic policy, has fixed exchange rates within the area 
but maintain flexible exchange rates with trading partners outside the area. 
Foreign exchange rate policy relates to the determination of exchange rates under 
different exchange rate regimes.  Appleyard and Field (1998) notes that central issue in the 
fixed-flexible exchange rate debate relates to provision of “domestic policy discipline” 
effects, the need to serve as instrument of greater growth in international trade and 
investment.  It also includes the need to provide for greater efficiency in resource 
allocation and promotion of growth as well as forestall destabilizing speculations in foreign 
exchange markets. Since this paper is concern with examining the extend to which 
exchange rates policies of the 5 participating countries in the West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ) projects affected individual and zonal export trade with the rest of the world, a 
number of related literature is reviewed  to provide the needed theoretical and analytical 
framework..   
A number of economic analysts studied the direct and indirect effects of exchange 
rates policies on export performance.  Egert, et. al. (2005) analyze the direct impact of 
exchange rate volatility on the export performance of ten Central and Eastern European 
transition economies as well as its indirect impact via changes in exchange rate regimes.  
The results suggest that the size and the direction of the impact of foreign exchange 
 6
volatility and of regime changes on exports vary considerably across sectors and countries 
and that they may be related to specific periods. 
Martin Berka (2005) asserts that the physical characteristics of goods and 
geography can explain both the puzzling persistence and volatility in the deviations of the 
international relative prices and the real exchange rate (the PPP persistence puzzle). He 
argues further that tradability of goods is endogenous, in that only goods with a deviation 
from the law of one price in excess of their trade cost are traded.  He concludes that a 
model with quadratic adjustment costs in the volume of trade is also capable of creating 
real exchange rate volatility, and so can explain the PPP puzzle entirely as a trade 
phenomenon. 
Duane, C., Philip R. Lane & Tara McIndoe (2006) investigated the impact of 
currency unions (OCA exchange rates arrangements) on Irish trade patterns. In contrast to 
most of the multi-country panel studies, they do not find any impact of EMU on trade.  This, 
they argued is qualitatively consistent with the pattern noted by Baldwin (2006) that EMU has 
had a bigger impact on the ‘core’ member countries than on the peripheral member countries 
that have weaker economic linkages with the rest of the currency union. They however, 
acknowledge that the time period may be too short to pick up the EMU effect on Irish trade, 
but noted the importance of the need to re-visit the study in a few years.  
 Egert et. al. (2005) notes that from an empirical point of view, the large body of 
literature focusing on developed countries generally cannot establish any clear and 
statistically significant link between exchange rate volatility and aggregate or bilateral 
export flows.  Although Klein (1990), Bini-Smaghi (1991), and McKenzie (1998), among 
others, show in their studies that differentiating between sectors yields more encouraging 
results, evidence from sectoral data suggests that the impact of volatility differs both in 
magnitude and direction across sectors. Interestingly, Fontaigne and Freudenberg (1999) 
showed that exchange rate volatility has a negative impact on intra-industry trade.  This 
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last assertion seemed to be supported by Doroodian (1999), Chou (2000), Achy and Sekkat 
(2001), Siregar and Rajan (2002), Arize et al. (2004) and Baak (2004), which showed that 
for less developed countries exchange rate volatility has negative effects on multilateral, 
bilateral and sectoral export data. Generally speaking, these papers unanimously support 
the hypothesis that exchange rate volatility has a negative effect on exports flows. In other 
words, an increase in volatility appears to depress exports in less developed countries. 
Along these lines, a related question very few researchers have investigated is whether 
changes in exchange rate regimes which can be associated with a shift in the amplitude of 
volatility cause export flows to decrease. 
3.    Model Specification 
 The underlying assumption of this model is that if exchange rate devaluation and/or 
volatility do not significantly influence bilateral and/or intra-regional trade flows of any 
group of countries, then these countries would be better off by eliminating the incidental 
foreign exchange transactions costs through a fixed exchange rate arrangements.   They are 
almost certain to face a common external market situation, and as such, they can 
collectively take a common stand when they trade with other third parties.   
 Although the selection of the correct trade equation in general and that of an export 
equation in particular is problematic, I adapt the specification by  Egert and Morales-
Zumaquero (2005) who analyzes the relationship between exchange rate volatility and 
trade flows for East and Central European countries in a very meticulous and systematic 
way. The export functions are estimated in nominal terms, and include domestic and 
foreign income (YDi and YFi ), relative prices (PDi and PFi), usually defined as export prices 
in the domestic economy and import prices in the foreign economy, the nominal exchange 
rate (ExNi) for nominal exports (XNi) respectively.   
 The implicit function of this model takes the following form: 
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 ( ) )1(,,.,X LLLLL∫= XNiFiDiFiDiNi EPPYY  
 Economic theory suggests that the impact of nominal and real income should be 
positive on nominal exports. Moreover, exchange rate depreciation may increase exports 
and the impact of domestic (foreign) relative prices on exports should be negative.  
Panel Data Issues and the Explicit Model 
 Given that WAMZ is made up of 5 countries, the logical method to be adopted for 
estimation of equations (1) would be pooled or panel data regressions.  The class of models 
that can be estimated using a pool object can be written as 
 )2(' LLLLitiititit xy εβα ++=  
where yit is the dependent variable, xit and βi  and  are k-vectors of non-constant regressors 
and parameters for  i = 1, 2, …, N cross-sectional units. Each cross-section unit is observed 
for dated periods t = 1, 2, …, T. This basic specification treats the pool specification as a 
system of equations and estimates the model using system of OLS. This specification is 
appropriate when the residuals are contemporaneously uncorrelated, and time-period and 
cross-section homoskedastic: 
  )3(2 LLLLTN II ⊗=Ω σ
The coefficients and their co variances are estimated using the usual OLS techniques 
applied to the stacked model. 
 For bilateral trade functions involving 5 countries, this would require the 
construction of a 5 x 2 cross sectional panel in order to capture the entire bilateral 
relationships.  The cross-sectional identifiers for the model are therefore 10 in numbers and 
reflected the following bi-lateral relations: Gambia-Ghana, Gambia-Guinea, Gambia-
Nigeria, Gambia-Sierra Leone, Ghana-Guinea, Ghana-Nigeria, Ghana-Sierra Leone, 
Guinea-Nigeria, Guinea-Sierra Leone and Nigeria-Sierra Leone.    
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 Two sets of pooled single equations models would be estimated: the first is the 
bilateral intra-WAMZ export functions, while the second, is designed to capture the global 
inter-WAMZ export functions.  Their implicit form is rooted in equation (1) specification 
which for analytical convenience is represented here as: 
( ) )4(,,.,X LLLLL∫= XNiFiDiFiDiNi EPPYY  
These equations can be rendered in a modified form as: 
( ) )5(,.,,BTE LLLLL∫= jijiijij PMEPMEGDPGDPEX   
and 
 ( ) )6(,.,,,TTE LLLLL∫= jijijiij PMEPMEGDPGDPEXEX  
Whereby:  
   )7(BTE ij LLLLLji BTEBTE +=
  , )8(TTE ij LLLLLji TTETTE +=
 )9(EXij LLLLLL
i
j
EX
EX=  
 )10(PMEi LLLLLL
i
i
PE
PM=  
 )11(PME j LLLLLL
j
j
PE
PM=  
Under the assumption that: 
    ortersnonoilbilateralforPME j expPME i =
   ortersnonoilversusoilbilateralforPME j expPME i ≠
And the variables defined as follows: BTE and TTE are the bilateral exports and 
total trade between two pairs ith and jth WAMZ member country (intra-WAMZ and global 
inter-WAMZ), GDP is defined as Real GDP; PMEi = Terms of Trade; PEi = Index of 
Export price; PMi = Index of Import price; EXij = Bilateral Nominal Cross  Exchange rate 
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between countries i and j; EXi = Nominal Exchange Rate of country i  to the US dollar; EXj 
= Nominal Exchange Rate of country j  to the US dollar. 
It is pertinent to note that three of the explanatory variables were included in the 
model in their ratio forms.  These are the ratios of export to import prices for each of the 
countries and the ratios of their exchange rates to the dollar.  While the former is included 
to capture each of the country’s terms of trade, the later is included as proxy for the 
implicit bilateral exchange rates between any of the two WAMZ countries, whose explicit 
exchange rates are recorded in local currency per US dollar (their official trading 
currency).    
4. The Empirical Results 
Equations 5 and 6 were estimated through the GLS methods (cross section 
weights), using a quarterly sample data which spans 1996:1 to 2004:4.  A total of 36 
observations were included while the number of cross-sections used is 10.  The total panel 
(balanced) observations were 360 and the estimation procedures used a one-step weighting 
matrix. Given the nature of the panel data, a GLS procedure is more likely to yield 
consistent estimates of the parameters of the pooled equation model than any other method.    
The log linear regression models were estimated and the results are summarized 
into a number of tables for analytical convenience.  It is worthy to mention that the 
relationship of interest in this regression analysis is the effect of bilateral exchange rate 
developments firstly on bilateral intra-WAMZ exports and secondly on the bilateral 
exports of the same set of countries with the rest of the world.   It is instructive to caution 
here that because the currencies of these countries are not convertible, and bilateral trade 
takes place between them through third party currencies (US dollar), this variable (the ratio 
of each countries exchange rate to the dollar) can be viewed as a good notional proxy for 
the implicit bilateral exchange rate of the two countries.   The effective transaction nominal 
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exchange rates between any pair of the countries is therefore expected to be understated, 
when they engage in trade, by the magnitude of currency conversion costs in addition to 
tariffs.   
The decision to present the export supply functions in its explicit log linear forms is 
informed by the econometric properties of the parameter estimates of the regression as well 
as the overall goodness of fit.   
Exchange Rate and Aggregate Bilateral Intra- and World Inter-WAMZ Exports 
 Table 1 presents the pooled regression results for bilateral intra-WAMZ and inter-
WAMZ exports trade with 
the rest of the world.  A 
comparison of the properties 
of the two single equation 
regression results shows that 
the overall goodness of fit of 
both equations is good.  A 
closer look at the bilateral 
intra-WAMZ regression 
results show that the 
coefficient estimates of 
bilateral exchange rate 
(variable of interest in this 
study) was not significant in 
explaining the changes in the bilateral intra-WAMZ exports.  This is not the case with the 
world inter-WAMZ regression results in which one of the partner’s exchange rate is 
significant and positively influences the collective exports of the two countries to the rest 
Dep. Variable
Indepent Variable Coef. t-Stat. Prob. Coef. t-Stat. Prob.
LOG(EXi?) 0.120 3.4 0.00
LOG(EXj?) 0.017 0.6 0.52
LOG(EXij?) 0.011 0.1 0.94
LOG(GDPi?) -6.380 -4.4 0.00 0.058 0.3 0.77
LOG(GDPj?) -3.872 -2.1 0.04 0.508 5.7 0.00
LOG(PMEi?) -5.869 -6.0 0.00 -0.509 -4.3 0.00
LOG(PMEj?) 0.660 1.5 0.14 -0.856 -13.2 0.00
Fixed Effects
_GAMGHA--C 47.2 2.9
_GAMGUI--C 48.0 1.8
_GAMNIG--C 46.2 5.5
_GAMSLN--C 44.3 -0.3
_GHAGUI--C 48.1 2.4
_GHANIG--C 53.0 4.9
_GHASLN--C 44.9 2.2
_GUINIG--C 50.6 5.0
_GUISLN--C 48.6 1.4
_NIGSLN--C 44.1 5.2
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9678 0.9959
Adjusted R-squared 0.9635 0.9957
S.E. of regression 0.7944 0.2823
Log likelihood -115.2 96.8
Durbin-Watson stat 0.8574 0.9572
    Mean dependent var -1.8 11.0
    S.D. dependent var 4.2 4.3
    Sum squared resid 66.3 27.4
    F-statistic 225.1 5593.6
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.0 0.0
LOG(BTEIJ) 
WORLD  INTER-WAMZ
LOG(TTEIJ)
Table 1: Regression Results of Exchange Rates and WAMZ Exports 
BILAT. INTRA-WAMZ 
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of the world.  This is an interesting result as it tends to validate our assertion that exchange 
rates does not matter much to intra-WAMZ exports to warrant its use as an instrument of 
bilateral trade stimulation, but can potentially be useful as a common tool of balance of 
payment adjustment against the rest of the world (third parties).  It can be inferred that the 
maintenance of independent flexible exchange rate policy by either party to the bilateral 
trade makes no difference in terms of export performance, and may indeed constitute an 
impediment to free trade within the WAMZ region. Among these impediments are 
microeconomic costs of foreign exchange conversion and high incident of trade diversion 
associated with it. 
The signs of the coefficients of real GDP of both countries and the terms of trade of 
one of the countries in the bilateral intra-WAMZ equations are negative, suggesting that 
changes in them adversely affect bilateral exports contrary to theoretical expectations.  The 
story is not the same with respect to global inter-WAMZ exports.  Indeed, the coefficient 
of the parameter estimates of these same variables are positive in signs, confirming that a 
common policy stance which stimulates their collective growth, and improves their terms 
of trade augurs well for their global export performance.   It is quite logical to deduce that 
improved terms of trade against third-parties should indeed have positive effects on the 
global exports of the sub-region, if and only if it is universal.  A priori information 
however show that although their structure of exports are similar when viewed from the 
perspective that they are all primary commodity exporters, there is a significant difference 
in their collective terms of trade.  The difference stems from the fact that while four of the 
countries – Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone – face the same terms of trade as the 
rest non-oil exporting countries which seemed to have deteriorated during the period, 
Nigeria had faced better terms of trade as a result of rise in crude oil prices in the 
international market during the same period.  
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Although insignificant, the positive sign of the parameter estimate of the exchange 
rate variable in the aggregate bilateral trade equation is remarkable.  This is because as a 
ratio the magnitude and direction of change is determined by the direction of the net 
difference in percentage changes over a comparative period of the individual exchange 
rates to the common third-party currency, in this case the US dollar.  It is therefore quite 
complementary to note that the parameter estimate of this variable has a positive sign 
suggesting that a common stand (especially one based on irrevocable commitments to one 
another) would augur well for intra-WAMZ and inter-WAMZ exports.    This may not be 
far from being correct as can be observed that one of the coefficient of the exchange rate 
variable in the global inter-WAMZ export model is significant and positively signed, while 
the second which also has a positive sign is insignificant.  This leads us to conclude that 
the net effect (which is insignificant) was driven by the small weight implied by the 
foreign exchange value of exports of the one with significant and credible exchange rate 
relative to the other.  Indeed, it also suggest that there exist within the sub-region an 
exchange rate stance which can form the basis for a credible anchor or irrevocable 
relationship, provided there exist the political will among members to act collectively.   
 Another interesting feature of the regression results is the fixed effects which are 
captured by the bilateral exports constants parameter estimates.  It is apparent that the two 
countries with the highest bilateral trade intensity is Nigeria-Ghana followed by Nigeria-
Guinea.  Incidentally, these are also the dominant economies of the sub-region with 
Nigeria alone accounting for more than 50 per cent of the population, GDP and exports of 
the region.    
Exchange Rate and Nigeria’s Bilateral Intra- and World Inter-WAMZ Exports 
 Table 2 presents the cross-sectional regression results of exchange rates (and other 
variables) on bilateral intra- and world inter-WAMZ exports of Nigeria to each of the other 
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member countries and jointly to the rest of the world.    Four pairs of equations are 
presented for Gambia-Nigeria, Ghana-Nigeria, Guinea-Nigeria and Nigeria-Sierra Leone 
bilateral exports.   The explanatory variable of interest in each of the model is the 
performance of the exchange rate defined as the bilateral cross rates (EXij), and the 
independent national exchange rates (EXi and EXj).    
The row represented by the cross rate variable in Table 2 is that of LOG(EXij).  As 
can be observed the signs of 3 out of the 4 estimated coefficients of the bilateral trade 
Dep. Variable
Indepent Variable Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat.
C 40.5 6.26 -12.8 3.82 -23.7 2.42 14.4 -2.45
LOG(EXi?) -0.05 -0.907 -0 -0.045 0.27 1.645 -0.13 -6.098
LOG(EXj?) -0.03 -1.042 0.01 0.324 -0.06 -2.437 -0.16 -2.458
LOG(EXij?) 0.03 0.304 0.15 4.446 -0.87 -4.511 0.86 4.592
LOG(GDPi?) -21.6 -16.04 2.15 3.478 -17.7 -16.71 -0.35 -0.253 19.1 8.136 0.42 0.865 -11.5 -8.31 3.71 9.678
LOG(GDPj?) 13.1 13.9 -1.67 -3.88 22.4 17.85 1.4 1.018 -16 -12.02 0.52 2.163 7.04 12.87 -0.9 -9.739
LOG(PMEi?) 5.56 4.536 -0.51 -1.97 -2.21 -6.992 -0.28 -1.17 -1.87 -0.979 -0.77 -3.001 3.53 9.053 -1.23 -28.08
LOG(PMEj?) -0.21 -1.059 -1.03 -22.87 0.41 7.578 -0.9 -17.87 -3.76 -10.94 -1.05 -20.48 -11.9 -5.73 -1.09 -5.026
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.78 0.84 0.56 0.83 0.39 0.84 0.76 0.88
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.83 0.54 0.83 0.37 0.84 0.75 0.87
S.E. of regression 0.56 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.97 0.13 1.06 0.12
Log likelihood -192 205 114 231 -437 225 -465 256
Durbin-Watson stat 1.13 0.7 1.32 0.62 1.02 0.78 1.28 1.07
    Mean dependent var -2.252 8.447 4.675 8.537 0.429 8.481 -1.1 8.449
    S.D. dependent var 1.145 0.337 0.266 0.313 1.22 0.328 2.14 0.339
    Sum squared resid 69.69 6.737 11.16 5.83 287.5 6.032 343.4 5.094
    F-statistic 56.17 116.2 31.46 115 14.18 124.1 70.89 163.1
    Prob(F-statistic) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LOG(BTEIJ) LOG(TTEIJ)
Nigeria-Sierra Leone
BILATERAL  WORLD
LOG(BTEIJ) LOG(TTEIJ)LOG(BTEIJ) LOG(TTEIJ) LOG(BTEIJ) LOG(TTEIJ)
Gambia-Nigeria Ghana-Nigeria Guinea-Nigeria
 BILATERAL  WORLD  BILATERAL  WORLD  BILATERAL  WORLD
Table 2: Regression Results of Exchange Rates and Exports - Gambia-Nigeria, Ghana-Nigeria,  
Guinea-Nigeria and Nigeria-Sierra Leone
equations are positive, but only two are significant: Ghana-Nigeria and Nigeria-Sierra 
Leone, while that of Gambia-Nigeria is insignificant.  Perhaps, the distance between the 
Gambia and Nigeria may explain the non-significance of this variable in this model.   Of 
particular interest, however, is the reason for the positive effects of this variable in these 
models.  This can be deduced from the negative signs of the coefficients of the individual 
exchange rate variable of their world exports model, suggesting that though current trends 
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in exchange rates hurts their collective exports to the world, it is most likely to augur well 
for their bilateral exports.  This may arise if they avoid the negative spillovers of their trade 
relations with the rest of the world.   
The regression result of the bilateral export trade between Guinea and Nigeria is 
very interesting. The coefficient of the bilateral cross rates was negative and significant, 
suggesting a net adverse effect on their bilateral exports.  This is likely to be so, since the 
estimate of coefficient of the Guinean exchange rate variable in their exports to the world 
model (which is positive but insignificant) appeared to be overwhelmed by the negative 
signs of the Nigerian exchange rate variable.  This suggests that the pursuit of a relatively 
fixed exchange rate by Guinea in the face of relatively flexible exchange rate by Nigeria 
culminated in a net adverse effect.     This may not be far from being correct, since a priori 
information indicated that at a time when exchange rates were devalued in Nigeria, Guinea 
kept her exchange rate fixed to the French Franc.  This has the salutary effects of 
cheapening Nigerian exports to the Guinea (Guinean imports from Nigeria), which 
stimulated it further.      
It can thus be concluded without any equivocation that exchange rates do not 
influence these countries bilateral trade, since actual trade takes place between them 
through a third party convertible currency.  Instead, the microeconomic costs of currency 
conversions incidental upon bilateral trade between them may actually act as an 
impediment to trade.  
Unfortunately, the parameter estimate of the coefficient of the terms of trade 
(which are significant in either or both bilateral export functions) exhibited negative signs, 
suggesting that its deterioration may be instrumental to the decline in both bilateral and 
world exports of these countries.  This is indicative of an adverse trade-off despite the fact 
that Nigeria supposedly face a better terms of trade than the others.  This is more likely to 
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be so given the structure of trade between the two countries.  Indeed, trade between them is 
dominated by oil exports from Nigeria whose price is determined by the world market 
developments as well as interventionist activities of OPEC (an export cartel), independent 
of bilateral market fundamentals and exchange rates developments.   
 Although separated by longer distance compared to the rest, Nigeria’s exports to 
the Gambia and Sierra Leone was responsive to the cross-over rates, largely for the same 
reasons adduced for the Nigeria-Guinea case.  However, the major difference with regards 
to the Sierra Leone’s case is that most of the exports were a support for reconstruction, as it 
coincided with the period when their economy was disrupted by civil disturbances and war. 
Exchange Rate and Ghana’s Exports to the Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone 
 The regression result of the bilateral exports of Ghana to other members of WAMZ 
(excluding Nigeria) is presented in Table 3.   Unlike the case of Nigeria (an oil exporter), 
the export supply functions relates to non-oil exporters who face the same terms of trade 
wither in their bilateral intra- and world inter-WAMZ trade.  Indeed, the coefficient of the 
cross rate variable in the model has a positive sign and significant in the case of Ghana-
Guinea and Ghana-Sierra Leone bilateral exports.  This suggests that bilateral exchange 
rates have a net positive effect on their bilateral exports.  This result is consistent with that 
of their collective export to the world model whose parameter estimates were significant 
but exhibited negative signs.     A close look at the table shows that the parameter estimate 
of the bilateral cross over exchange rates variable is significant in each of the cross-
sectional bilateral equations estimated.     However, while the sign of the exchange rate 
coefficient is positive in the case of Ghana-Gambia export supply functions, they are 
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Dep. Variable
Indepent Variable Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat.
C -7.59 -1.46 -51.7 5.44 -19.1 1.21
LOG(EXi?) 0.24 5.1 -0.13 -4.53 -0.28 -8.8
LOG(EXj?) -0.43 -15.4 -0.11 -1.18 0.41 7.2
LOG(EXij?) 0.09 1.4 2.1 7.9 0.19 11.2
LOG(GDPi?) 16.7 12.1 -1.31 -2.7 6.97 7.4 2.33 15.3 3.24 52.5 0.31 0.9
LOG(GDPj?) -15.6 -9.5 3.5 6.0 3.56 2.8 -1.65 -7.7 0.06 2.0 0.55 8.4
LOG(PMEi?) -1.27 -2.5 1.42 7.9 2.82 2.2 0.79 5.3 1.05 7.9 1.23 7.4
LOG(PMEj?)
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.759 0.613 0.27 0.64 0.96 0.69
Adjusted R-squared 0.750 0.597 0.24 0.63 0.95 0.68
S.E. of regression 0.29 0.1 0.76 0.08 0.08 0.10
Log likelihood -61.0 321.6 -407 389 421 340.7
Durbin-Watson stat 1.93 2.13 0.64 2.12 1.08 2.00
    Mean dependent var -1.6 6.1 -2.5 6.4 -3.399 6.1
    S.D. dependent var 0.6 0.2 0.9 0.137 0.355 0.170
    Sum squared resid 29.6 3.5 202.0 2.4 2.0 3.2
    F-statistic 84.0 39.0 9.7 43.8 565.5 55.5
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BILATERAL  WORLD
LOG(BTEIJ) LOG(TTEIJ)
Gambia-Ghana
Table 3: Regression Results of Exchange Rates and Exports of 
Gambia-Ghana, Ghana-Guinea and Ghana-Sierra Leone
Ghana-Guinea Ghana-Sierra Leone
LOG(BTEIJ) 
WORLD
LOG(TTEIJ)
 BILATERAL  BILATERAL  WORLD
LOG(BTEIJ) LOG(TTEIJ)
negative in the Ghana-Guinea and Ghana-Sierra Leone estimations.  It may be inferred 
therefore that in the case of Ghana-Gambia bilateral export functions, disproportionate co-
variability to a third-party currency of their independent exchange rates, and which 
amounts to a net depreciation in the value of the implicit cross-over rate, stimulates 
bilateral exports.     This cannot be said of Ghana’s bilateral exports to Guinea and Sierra 
Leone as the signs of the parameter estimate of the coefficient of the implicit cross-over 
exchange rate suggests that depreciation hurts it significantly.    Perhaps the only reason 
this might be so could be that Ghana’s exports compete with those from these countries.  
This is most likely to be so, as these countries (Ghana inclusive) are known to be exporters 
of similar primary agricultural and mineral products.  This suggests that a net devaluation 
may induce exports of these countries to a third-party while indeed depressing her bilateral 
trade.   This can be the case if transaction costs incidental upon trade, especially those 
associated with transportation, microeconomic costs of currency conversion and other 
barriers makes such bilateral trade unattractive. 
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Bilateral Exports Functions of Gambia-Guinea, Gambia-Sierra Leone and 
Guinea-Sierra Leone  
 The regression results of these countries bilateral export functions are presented on 
Table 4.  It is interesting to note that the estimates of the coefficient of the implicit 
Dep. Variable
Indepent Variable Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat.
C 34.76 11.32 18.31 -3.5 -72.5 3.09
LOG(EXi?) 0.559 5.3 1.24 2.4 0.24 1.6
LOG(EXj?) 0.007 0.042 -1.2 -4.3 -0.05 -0.9
LOG(EXij?) 2.939 5.259 0.205 1.0 1.753 5.7
LOG(GDPi?) 8.341 4.545 -1.25 -2.5 -7.66 -16.7 2.751 1.9 13.5 14.5 -0.44 -0.8
LOG(GDPj?) -18.2 -6.234 -0.35 -0.7 2.809 9.3 -0.25 -0.5 0.574 2.4 0.6 8.5
LOG(PMEi?) -6.18 -3.891 0.625 2.4 2.287 3.9 6.16 6.6 2.937 2.1 0.43 1.6
LOG(PMEj?)
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.282 0.287 0.564 0.628 0.690 0.5
Adjusted R-squared 0.255 0.258 0.543 0.613 0.678 0.48
S.E. of regression 0.973 0.150 0.337 0.556 0.788 0.15
Log likelihood -494 180.2 -86 -292 -418 177
Durbin-Watson stat 0.606 1.657 1.345 1.388 0.559 1.62
    Mean dependent var -3.101 5.108 -4.424 2.905 -1.761 5.2
    S.D. dependent var 1.127 0.174 0.499 0.894 1.39 0.2
    Sum squared resid 327.4 7.7 30.3 106.7 214.9 7.9
    F-statistic 10.5 9.9 26.5 41.6 59.2 24.6
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LOG(BTEIJ) LOG(TTEIJ)LOG(BTEIJ) LOG(TTEIJ) LOG(BTEIJ) LOG(TTEIJ)
Guinea-Sierra Leone
 BILATERAL  WORLD  BILATERAL  WORLD  BILATERAL  WORLD
Gambia-Guinea Gambia-Sierra Leone
Table 4: Regression Results of Exchange Rates and Exports of 
Gambia-Guinea, Gambia-Sierra Leone and Guinea-Sierra Leone
crossover exchange rates in each of the estimated equation are significant but negatively 
signed.  This suggests that erstwhile net bilateral exchange rates harm bilateral exports of 
these countries.  This is similar to the Ghana’s case, as the countries are also known to 
export similar products.  It can be inferred that eliminating exchange rates costs could 
minimize the adverse impact on bilateral trade. 
5. Summary of Findings and Concluding Remarks 
This study examines the effect of exchange rate policy on the bi-lateral intra-
WAMZ and global inter-WAMZ export to the rest of the world with a view to gauging its 
relative veracity among other determinants.  Four key findings emanates from this study: 
i. The implicit bilateral exchange rate (variable of interest in this study) was not 
significant in explaining the changes in the bilateral intra-WAMZ exports.  This is 
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not the case with the world inter-WAMZ regression results in which one of the 
partner’s exchange rate is significant and positively influences the collective 
exports of these countries to the rest of the world.  This result is considered 
interesting as it tends to validate the assertion that exchange rates does not matter 
much to intra-WAMZ exports to warrant its use as an instrument of bilateral trade 
stimulation, but can potentially be useful as a common tool of balance of payment 
adjustment against the rest of the world (third parties). 
ii. Real economic growth and changes in terms of trade of one of the countries in the 
bilateral intra-WAMZ equations are negative, suggesting that they have adverse 
effect on bilateral exports contrary to theoretical expectations. This is, however, 
contrary to the results for the global inter-WAMZ exports functions which 
exhibited positive signs, thereby suggesting that a common policy stance which 
stimulates growth and improves their terms of trade augurs well for their collective 
global export performance.   
iii. The gains from either an independent or collective policy stance can be severely 
limited given the sharp differences in their terms of trade, despite the similarity in 
the structure of exports.  The difference stems from the fact that while four of the 
countries – Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone – face the same terms of 
trade as the rest non-oil exporting countries which seemed to have deteriorated 
during the period, Nigeria had faced better terms of trade as a result of rise in crude 
oil prices in the international market during the same period.  
iv. Another interesting feature of the regression results is the fixed effects which are 
captured by the bilateral exports constants parameter estimates.  It is apparent that 
the two countries with the highest bilateral trade intensity is Nigeria-Ghana 
followed by Nigeria-Guinea.  Incidentally, these are also the dominant economies 
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of the sub-region with Nigeria alone accounting for more than 50 per cent of the 
population, GDP and exports of the region.   
  In concluding the study inferred that the maintenance of independent flexible 
exchange rate policy by either party to the bilateral trade makes no difference in terms of 
export performance, and may indeed constitute an impediment to free trade within the 
WAMZ region. Among the impediments identified are the microeconomic costs of foreign 
exchange conversion and high incident of trade diversion associated with it.   
Perhaps, one may be inclined to infer and agree with the “per capita income ex post 
convergence” theorists who maintain that regional integration especially the one advanced 
by creating a monetary union, may lead to convergence of income levels by stimulating 
growth in the poorer countries through increased trade (Masson and Pattillo (2004)).  This 
is also consistent with the assertion by Jenkins and Thomas (1996) that “there is a growing 
consensus that ‘convergence clubs’ exist, where countries with a lower GNP per capita 
grow more rapidly because they are members of a trade group, or because domestic policy 
gains credibility by being tied to the domestic policy of a country with a better economic 
reputation”.   This leads us to conclude that although the net effect of bilateral exchange 
rates is currently insignificant, the real GDP and terms of trade variables suggest that an ex 
post economic convergence club, driven by both Nigeria and Ghana can emerge among the 
group, provided there exist the political will among members to act collectively. 
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